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 Is the road to regional integration paved with pollution convergence?  
Abstract 
This paper evaluates the impact of free trade agreements (FTAs) on carbon dioxide 
emissions convergence for a cross-section of 182 countries over the period 1980 to 
2008, paying particular attention to Mediterranean and European Union countries. In 
order to overcome the endogeneity problem of the FTA variable, a propensity score 
matching approach is first used to match country pairs. Next the convergence properties 
of relative CO2 emissions are examined for the whole panel and for the matched sample 
using difference-in-difference techniques. The main results indicate that CO2 emissions 
of the pairs of countries that belong to an FTA tend to converge, and do so at a higher 
rate for more advanced integration agreements. In particular, we find that emissions 
converge more rapidly for NAFTA and EU-27 countries than for Euro-Med countries. 
Keywords: Pollution haven hypothesis, convergence, CO2 emissions, Euro-med 
Agreements, difference-in-difference 
JEL Classification: F 18, O13, L60, Q43 
I.  Introduction 
One  of  the  most  controversial  debates  in  trade  policy  concerns  the  impact  of  trade 
liberalization on the environment. Trade liberalization can be implemented unilaterally, 
with  a  single  country  reducing  its  trade  barriers  against  all  its  trading  partners,  or 
regionally, with a group of countries forming a Free Trade Agreement to eliminate trade 
barriers among them. The latter form of trade liberalization has been predominant since 
the early 1990s and there is increasing interest in assessing the effects stemming from 
this new regionalism. Not only direct trade and income effects are important, but also 
the impact on the environment. After two decades of research, it is commonly accepted 
that the main effects of trade liberalization on the environment can be classified into scale, composition and technique effects and that there may also be interaction between 
these effects (Copeland and Taylor, 2003).  
At the heart of the debate is the question of whether trade liberalization will cause 
pollution-intensive industries to locate in countries with relatively weak environmental 
regulations. The Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) predicts that trade liberalization 
will  cause  pollution-intensive  industries  to  migrate  from  countries  with  stringent 
environmental  regulations  to  countries  with  lax  environmental  regulations  (Taylor, 
2004;  Levinson  and  Taylor,  2008).  In  other  words,  the  PHH  takes  differences  in 
environmental  policy  as  given  and  asks  what  happens  if  a  country  liberalizes  trade 
(Korves and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2011). One derived consequence, if the PHH holds, is 
that  developing  and  developed  countries  should  converge  in  terms  of  pollution 
emissions (Jakob, Haller and Marschinski, 2011). 
Many studies have focused on the effects of NAFTA on the environment (Grossman 
and Krueger, 1991; Stern, 2007) and, contrary to early expectations, the early findings 
point to positive effects. Surprisingly, few studies have been devoted to other regional 
trade agreements. Most of the recent literature  used changes in trade openness as a 
proxy for trade liberalization. An alternative strategy is to directly include a trade policy 
variable  in  an  emissions  equation.  The  main  shortcoming  of  this  strategy  is  that 
countries possibly select into trade agreements, which could generate endogeneity bias. 
This research introduces two main novelties in the current literature. Firstly, we apply a 
fresh methodology to overcome the problem related to the endogeneity of the FTA 
variable in the emissions equation by using a propensity matching score approach to 
select  similar  countries  and  estimating  the  model  using  difference-in-difference 
techniques.  Secondly,  we  focus  specifically  on  the Euro-Mediterranean  Agreements, 
which are a good example of a North-South FTA, and compare the results to those obtained  for  NAFTA  and  EU-27,  more  advanced  integration  agreements.  The  main 
results indicate that CO2 emissions of the pairs of countries that belong to an FTA tend 
to converge and do so at a higher rate for more advanced integration agreements. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the main theoretical prediction and 
Section  3  reviews  the  main  empirical  literature.  Section  4  describes  the  empirical 
strategy and the data, variables and main results are presented in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
II.  Regional  Integration  and  Emission  Convergence:  Theoretical 
Predictions  
1.  Pollution Haven Hypothesis  
The  negotiations  for  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  were 
followed by  fears  about  its  consequences  on  the  environment.  Indeed,  the  literature 
between trade and environmental quality has emerged in this period. Grossman and 
Kruger  (1991)  was  the  first  paper  to  decompose  the  total  impact  of  trade  on  the 
environment into three different effects: scale, technique and composition effects. 
The scale effect is assumed to have a negative effect on the environment. According to 
general belief, trade liberalization leads to an expansion in economic activity and, all 
other things being equal (composition and techniques of production), the total amount 
of pollution will then increase (for example, economic growth, due to trade, raises the 
demand for energy and boosts transportation, which is one of the main emitting sectors). 
It is worth noting that this pass-through between trade and the environment assumes a 
positive effect of trade liberalization on economic growth
5. The income effects of trade 
                                                 
5 A large body of empirical literature provides empirical evidence of this positive effect of openness (see 
for example Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), Frankel and 
Romer (1999) or Rodriguez and Rodrik (2003) for a critical review). are linked to the literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which assumes 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and pollution: Pollution 
increases in the early stages of development until it reaches a turning point and then 
declines (Copland and Gulati, 2006).
6 However, it is nowadays generally accepted that 
an EKC for CO2 does not exist for most economies (Carson, 2010). 
The second pass-through between trade and the environment is the so-called technique 
effect. Holding the scale of the economy and the mix of goods produced constant, a 
reduction in the intensity of emissions – measured in terms of emissions by unit of 
output - results in a decline in pollution. Three main arguments are behind this effect. 
First,  increased  trade  promotes  the  transfer  of  modern  (cleaner)  technologies  from 
developed  to  developing  countries.  Second,  if  trade  raises  income,  individuals  may 
demand higher environmental quality (if the latter is a normal good). Third, according 
to the Porter-hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995), increased globalization will 
increase competition. In order to stay competitive, firms have to invest in the newest 
and most efficient technologies. Thus, more stringent environmental policy can increase 
international competitiveness. In summary, the technique effect has a positive impact on 
the environment (Mathys, 2002). 
Third,  comparative  advantage  is  also  an  important  factor  that  could  explain  the 
relationship between trade and the environment. The economy will pollute more if it 
devotes more resources to the production of pollution-intensive goods, holding the scale 
of the economy and emission intensities constant. The composition effect – also referred 
to as the trade-composition or trade-induced composition effect - is caused by changes 
in trade policy. Through trade liberalization, countries specialize in the sectors where 
they enjoy a comparative advantage. Among the sources of comparative advantage, we 
                                                 
6 The name of the environmental Kuznets curve relates to the work by Kuznets (1955), who found a 
similar inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and GDP per capita (Kuznets, 1955). find classical factor endowment differences or unit cost differences and those based on 
differences in institutions or regulations between countries. On the one hand, the factor 
endowment hypothesis (FEH) states that environmental policy has no significant effect 
on  trade  patterns,  factor  endowments  determining  trade  instead.  This  implies  that 
relatively capital-abundant countries will export pollution-intensive goods, since most 
pollution-intensive goods are capital-intensive. On the other hand, the Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis  (PHH)  states  that  differences  in  environmental  regulations  are  the  main 
motivation for trade and that trade liberalization causes pollution-intensive industries to 
relocate from high income countries with stringent environmental regulations to low 
income countries with lax environmental regulations (Taylor, 2004). Hence, with trade 
liberalization, high income countries will specialize in the production of clean goods 
and pollution in these countries will decline, while low income countries will specialize 
in producing dirty goods and their level of pollution will increase. 
In general, we expect countries to differ in both factor endowments and environmental 
policy.  High-income  countries  tend  to  be  capital-abundant  and  also  have  stricter 
environmental regulations than low-income countries. On the one hand, the North could 
become a dirty-good importer (as it has stricter environmental policy) and, on the other 
hand, it might become a dirty-good exporter (because of its capital abundance). The 
interaction  of  these  two  effects  determines  the  pattern  of  trade.  If  pollution  haven 
motives are more important than factor endowment motives, the North will import the 
dirty good from the South. On the contrary, trade could cause the North to specialize in 
the production and exportation of the pollution-intensive good when factor endowment 
differences dominate regulatory differences, despite having the stricter environmental 
regulations (Copeland and Taylor, 2003). In  summary,  we  can  expect  comparative  advantage  to  be  determined  jointly  by 
differences  in  regulatory  policy  and  factor  endowments.  If  the  PHH  dominates, 
following a liberalization process between a developing and a developed country, per-
capita  emissions will converge.  If FEH motives dominate, per-capita  emissions will 
diverge. In what follows, we describe the theoretical link between regional integration 
and emissions using the PHH-FEH framework. 
2.  Regional Integration and Pollution Haven 
In  the  specific  case  of  regional  integration  agreements  (RTA),  the  pollution  haven 
hypothesis is particularly important. More specifically, when countries sign an RTA, 
not only tariff dismantling is planned, but also cooperation in other areas, namely the 
protection of the environment and cross-border investments are sometimes included, 
among other issues. For example, in the case of NAFTA, in order to address public 
concerns  about  its  environmental  impact,  a  side  agreement  on  the  environment  was 
signed.  The  North  American  Agreement  on  Environmental  Cooperation  (NAAEC) 
stipulates that “… each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high 
levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws 
and regulations”
7. Moreover, in order to avoid a race to the bottom in environmental 
regulation among the three  countries, a Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(CEC) was created in 1994.  
These two policy mechanisms, created in the case of NAFTA, illustrate the possible 
policy  responses  to  potential  effects  of  regional  integration  on  the  environment.  In 
particular, there could be two opposite effects at work. First, according to the PHH and 
the race to the bottom arguments, countries, especially southern countries, can adopt lax 
                                                 
7 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the government of Canada, the 
government of the United Mexican States and the government of the United States of America, part 2: 
Obligations, article 3: levels of protection. http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/Env-9141.asp#TWO.  environmental legislation in order to attract multinationals and favor a relocation of 
economic activity from the developed partner. This relocation of “dirty” activities leads 
to convergence in the level of emissions. Second, regional integration can lead to the 
harmonization of rules and standards, especially where the environmental is concerned, 
which could prevent convergence in emissions. 
III. Regional integration and emissions: A survey 
After  describing  the  theoretical  mechanisms,  this  section  briefly  surveys  the 
econometric studies dealing with the link between trade and the environment and testing 
the PHH. 
The typical strategy of early studies was to regress trade flows on a measure of environmental 
stringency (target variable) and other relevant control variables, such as income per capita, by 
using  cross-section  country  data  or  pooled  cross-section  data  over  time  (Tobey,  1990; 
Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Lucas et al., 1992; Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993; Van Beers and 
van den Bergh, 1997 and Mani and Wheeler, 1998 are some examples). These studies found 
rather  mixed  results,  but  in  general,  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  target  variable  is 
insignificant and small in magnitude. The basic problem is that these specifications were not 
able to control for unobserved heterogeneity or the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables 
(Korves and Martinez-Zarzoso, 2011). The recent literature tries to correct this by employing 
panel data. In reference to the recent studies using trade flows as the dependent variable, it is 
worth  mentioning  Levinson  and  Taylor  (2008).  The  authors  examine  the  effect  of 
environmental regulations on trade flows using data on U.S. regulations and net trade flows 
between the U.S., Canada and Mexico for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986. 
They conclude that, as predicted by the PHH, industries whose abatement costs increased the 
most experienced the largest increases in net imports. Jug and Mirza (2005) obtained similar 
results for a sample of 12 importing countries from the EU15 and 19 exporting countries from 
the EU 27 over the period 1996-1999.  Antweiler et al. (2001), a widely cited study, extend the work of Grossman and Krueger (1991) 
and develop a theoretical model based on the decomposition of the effect of trade on the 
environment into scale, composition and technique effects. They estimate and add up these 
effects to explore the overall effect of increased trade on the environment, thereby allowing 
for pollution haven and factor endowment motives. They regress a country’s sulfur dioxide 
concentrations  on  trade  intensity,  factor  endowments,  scale  of  production  activity  and 
determinants of environmental policy (such as per capita income). In order to capture the 
composition  effect  of  trade,  they  interact  trade  intensity  with  country  characteristics 
determining comparative advantage (per capita income and capital-labor ratio). Their results 
show  that  trade  intensity  per  se  is  not  significant.  But,  when  interacted  with  country 
characteristics, the estimated effect is positive, statistically significant and small. Moreover, 
factor endowment motives for trade seem to dominate the pollution haven driven force, thus 
implying  that  high  income  countries  tend  to  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  pollution-
intensive goods. When they add up the estimates of scale, technique and composition effects, 
they  find  that  increased  trade  causes  a  decline  in  sulfur  dioxide  concentrations.  Hence, 
Antweiler et al. (2001) conclude that freer trade seems to be good for the environment. Dean 
(2002) develops an approach using a simple Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade with 
endogenous factor supply (i.e. it can be affected by trade policy). It consists of a two-equation 
system  that  captures  the  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  the  environment  through  two 
channels:  its  direct  effect  on  the  composition  of  output  (the  composition  effect)  and  its 
indirect effect via income growth (the technique effect). The author finds that a fall in trade 
restrictions  has  multiple  effects  on  emissions  growth:  A  direct  negative  effect  on 
environmental  quality  via  the  composition  effect  and  an  indirect  positive  effect  via  the 
technique effect. In the author’s estimation, the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect, 
suggesting trade is good for the environment. Cole and Elliot (2003) rely on Antweiler et al. 
(2001) to empirically test for the effects of trade on emissions (per capita), emission intensities and concentration levels for different air and water pollutants. They find that results depend 
on how the dependent variable is measured (concentrations versus emissions) and also vary by 
pollutant. Frankel and Rose (2005) take into account the endogeneity of income and especially 
trade, the latter by using instrumental variables derived from the gravity model of bilateral 
trade.  However,  the  authors  use  a  cross-section  approach,  instead  of  using  a  panel  data 
approach as most recent papers do. This means the study has a possible weakness, since they 
do  not  control  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  that  is  time-invariant  (Korves  and  Martínez-
Zarzoso, 2011). Frankel and Rose (2005) employ an EKC framework: they regress a measure of 
air  pollutants  (measured  in  concentrations)  on  per  capita  income  and  its  square,  trade, 
institutional quality
8 and land area. Their results show that controlling for endogeneity does 
not affect the earlier findings. They find trade has a positive impact on air quality and they also 
find support for the EKC. Moreover, they do not find evidence for a ‘race to the bottom’ driven 
by trade or support for the PHH. More recently, Managi et al. (2009) combine the specification 
derived  from  Antweiler  et  al.  (2001)  and  the  use  of  instrumental  variable  estimations  to 
correct the endogeneity of income and trade. They find that trade has a beneficial effect on 
the environment depending on the pollutant and the country. OECD countries benefit from 
trade, whereas trade increases emissions in the case of Non OECD countries. The net effect of 
the increase in international trade flows is likely to be determined by the change in trade 
patterns (composition effect) in which connectivity may play a crucial role (Bensassi et al, 
2011). Finally, Korves and Martínez-Zarzoso (2011) give support to the PHH for CO2 emissions 
and energy consumption, but not for SO2.  
 
Stern (2007) is, to the best of our knowledge, the only study addressing the link between 
regional integration and emissions convergence. The author investigates whether or not 
entry into NAFTA has led to a convergence in energy use and emissions of pollutants in 
                                                 
8 This variable is proxied by an indicator for democracy (polity), which ranges from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) and is taken from the Polity IV project. Mexico, the United States and Canada. Results show strong evidence of convergence 
for all intensity indicators across the three countries toward a lower level. Although 
intensity initially rises for some variables in Mexico, it eventually begins to fall after 
NAFTA comes into force. Per capita measures for two pollutants (sulfur and NOx) also 
show convergence, but this is not the case for energy and carbon. The latter variables 
drift  moderately  upwards.  The  state  of  technology  in  energy  efficiency  and  sulfur 
abatement  is  improving  in  all  countries,  although  there  is  little,  if  any,  sign  of 
convergence and NAFTA has no effect on the trend of technology diffusion. According 
to these results, Mexico’s technology is improving at a slower rate than its two northern 
neighbors. 
IV. Empirical strategy 
Along the same lines as Stern (2007), we aim to explore whether emissions converge 
for countries involved in an FTA. We depart from Stern (2007) by adopting matching 
and  difference-in-difference  estimation  techniques  that  allow  us  to  control  for  the 
endogeneity of the FTA variable in the emissions equation.  
Our starting point is a simplified version of the determinants of emissions. Per capita 
emissions depend on population, per-capita GDP and an openness ratio. These variables 
are assumed to control for the scale, technique and composition effects
9.  
In order to test for the convergence of emissions, we estimate a log-linear emissions 
equation in relative terms in which the dependent variable is the log of CO2 emissions 
of country i relative to country j in period t (Emit/Emjt). The estimated model is given 
by, 
 
                                                 
9 Our model considers the main factors affecting emissions in line with the IPAT identity and the STIRPAT 
model (Martínez-Zarzoso and Maurotti, 2011).  
 
where   and  refer to countries, and   to the year.   represents the pollution emissions 
gap between a pair of countries  . Popit (Popjt) is population in number of inhabitants in 
country i (j) in year t. GDPcapit (GDPcapjt) is GDP per capita at constant ppp prices in country i 
(j) in year t. Openit (Openjt) refers to the openness ratio measured as the sum of exports and 
imports divided by gross domestic product. 
The  absolute  value  of  each  relative  term  is  considered  in  order  to  have  only  one 
interpretation of an increase in the value of the variable, since any increase (decrease) 
implies divergence (convergence) between both countries. For example, an increase in 
the  left-hand-side  variable  in  equation  (1),  means  that  there  is  divergence  in  the 
emissions of countries. 
We add the variable 
10, which is a dummy variable taking the value   if countries 
are involved in a free trade agreement in the considered year and zero otherwise, to the 




The sign of   allows to test for the PHH. A positive sign means that the emissions gap 
between  a  pair  of  countries  that  have  an  FTA  increases,  whereas  a  negative  sign 
suggests convergence in the emissions gap of countries linked by an FTA.  
The  FTA  variable  will  be  addressed  using  matching  techniques.  These  techniques 
provide a simple way to deal with the selection induced by FTAs. Bergstrand and Baier 
(2004)  give  evidence  that  country  pairs  involved  in  FTAs  tend  to  share  common 
                                                 
10   will be denoted as   for simplicity. economic and geographic characteristics. Few studies use matching techniques to deal 
with FTAs. Egger et al. (2008) used a difference-in-difference panel matching estimator 
to  examine  primarily  the  effect  of  FTA  formations  on  changes  in  shares  of  intra-
industry trade. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) provide the first cross section estimates of 
long-run  treatment  effects  of  free  trade  agreements  (FTA)  on  members’  bilateral 
international trade flows using non parametric matching econometrics. Their findings 
show  that  matching  estimators  provide  plausible  estimates  of  the  average  treatment 
effects of an FTA on the trade of members that actually form one. We follow a similar 
methodology  to  match  pairs  of  countries  that  have  an  FTA  with  similar  pairs  of 
countries that are not linked by any FTA. After obtaining the matched samples for each 
year, we use a difference-in-difference estimator to evaluate the effect of the treated 
FTA variable on emissions convergence. 
The effect of an FTA on the outcome
11 (  which is the pollution emissions gap) of a 
pair of countries is defined as the difference between the pollution emissions gap of a 
pair of countries after enforcing a Free Trade Agreement and the outcome that these 
countries  would  have  without  an  FTA.  Put  differently,  the  impact  of  an  FTA  is 
measured by the change in the pair of countries’ outcome, which is attributable to the 
FTA only. 
The difference-in-difference (hereafter DID) approach is well suited to dealing with this 
question  (Meyer,  1994;  Heckman  et  al.,  1997).  Considering  the  FTA  process  as  a 
natural experiment, the DID method evaluates the average effect of the treatment (here 
the FTA) on treated units (pairs of countries linked by an FTA and denoted by  ). 
The idea is that comparing the outcome of a pair of countries before and after an FTA is 
not satisfactory because we do not have a counterfactual (outcome variable for the pair 
                                                 
11 We follow Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) in this section and adapt their empirical strategy to FTAs. of countries if they had not entered the FTA). In order to control for this skew, the DID 
method compares the difference in outcome before and after the FTA for participating 
countries to that for a control group. The latter is composed of pairs of countries that 
have never been part of an FTA. These countries are referred to hereafter as  .  
Formally, let   be the outcome in period  for a pair of countries   which has been 
member of an FTA. We denote   the outcome for the same country pair assuming it 
was not linked by an FTA. The effect of the FTA for this pair   is then measured by 
. 
The average impact of the FTA is described by  . Unfortunately, we cannot 
observe  the  outcome  for  the  same  pair  of  countries  both  as  a  participant  and  as  a 
nonparticipant in an FTA. In other words, we cannot ascertain the outcome of the event 
of nonparticipation for a pair of countries that signed a trade agreement or conversely. 
In order to overcome this difficulty, we compare the evolution of the groups FTA and 





The terms   and   refer respectively to the period before and after the FTA. 
Hence, the missing counterfactual value could be replaced by the state of country pairs 
before the agreement, adjusted to take into account the growth in aggregate outcome: 
 
 
 Where    denotes  the  DID 
estimator that assesses the impact of an FTA on participating countries. We obtain it by 
regressing data pooled across the treatment (country pairs with FTA) and the control 




 is a dummy variable taking a value 1 for treated country pairs and 0 otherwise. It 
controls for differences in constant outcome   between treated pairs of countries and 
the control group. We define the dummy variable  as taking a value 1 in the post-
FTA years and 0 otherwise for both FTA and non-FTA countries. This dummy variable 
controls  for  time  effects  on  outcome  .  Finally,  the  term    is  an 
interaction  term  between    and  .  Its  coefficient    represents  the  DID 
estimator of the effect of an FTA on the treated group. The framework described by 
equation 3 is extended by including a vector of the characteristic ratio of a country’s 
pair. 
These explanatory variables control for differences in observable attributes between the 




where  the  vector    represents  the  ratio  of  some  observable  features  of  a  pair  of 
countries  at  time  .  These  observables  are  population,  GDP  per  capita  and 
Openness ratios as presented in equation (2).   denotes time-specific dummies that control for factors common to all countries.   is an idiosyncratic error term that is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
Next we explain how the choice of the comparison group is made. Intuitively, the DID 
method does not provide valid estimations when the comparison group differs greatly 
from  the  treated  pairs  of  countries  over  the  pre-FTA  period.  In  order  to  solve  this 
problem,  we  combine  the  DID  estimation  with  the  matching  method  (Blundell  and 
Costa  Dias,  2000)
12.  Propensity  score  matching  techniques  identify  a  control  group 
without marked differences in characteristics compared to treated pairs of countries. 
Failure to account for the selection problem would bias the estimated impact of an FTA. 
It may lead to correlation between the FTA variable and the error term in the outcome 
equation. This will be the case when the agreement decision is not a random process, 
but due to observable characteristics associated to a given trading pair of countries, such 
as distance, which also influences the post-liberalization outcome. The propensity score 
method therefore controls for selection based on observed characteristics. Furthermore, 
matching  pairs  of  countries  directly  could  require  comparing  the  groups  FTA  and 
NFTA  across  a  large  number  of  observable  pre-liberalization  characteristics.  The 
propensity  score  method  reduces  the  dimensionality  issue  by  capturing  all  the 
information from these characteristics on a single basis (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
In particular, it measures the probability of signing the agreement according to a vector 




                                                 
12 The matching method is a nonparametric method. No particular specification is assumed. where the vector   represents pair wise characteristics. Once the propensity scores 
are calculated, observations from the treated group and the control group are matched. 
Each treated pair of countries is associated with a pair of control countries endowed 
with a similar propensity score
13. We apply this econometric methodology to the 
pollution emissions gap of a pair of countries linked by an FTA during the period 1980-
2008. 
We use propensity score matching (PSM) to construct a statistical comparison group 
that  is  based  on  a  model  of  the  probability  of  participating  in  the  treatment,  using 
observed characteristics. Participants are then matched on the basis of this probability, 




where RGDPij denotes the sum of the real GDP of countries i and j . 
Disij denotes the great circle distance between countries i and j.  
Contiguity takes a value of one for countries that share a border, zero otherwise. 
Common  language  takes  a  value  of  one  for  countries  that  have  the  same  official 
language. 
The validity of PSM depends on two conditions: 
(a)  Conditional  independence  (namely,  that  unobserved  factors  do  not  affect 
participation). 
(b) Sizeable common support or overlap in propensity scores across the participant and 
non participant sample. 
                                                 
13 We use the “calliper” matching method to select the control pairs of countries. The assumption of common support or overlap condition for matching on the propensity 
score is that the estimated score is smaller than unity throughout. This condition ensures 
that treatment observations have comparison observations “nearby” in the propensity 
score  distribution  (Heckman,  Lalonde,  and  Smith,  1999).  The  probability  model 
provides us with an estimate of the propensity score  . In our case, the latter is to be 
interpreted as the likelihood of entering an FTA, conditional on the observables. Next, 
we have to ensure that the treated units (new FTA members) and the control units (the 
comparable subgroup of non-members) are similar with respect to every observable  . 
Thus, balancing tests will be conducted to verify whether the average propensity score 
and mean  is the same
14. 
We base our choice of explanatory variables in the probability model on Baier and 
Bergstrand  (2004).  These  authors  show  that  gravity  variables,  namely  GDP  and 
distance, are the main determinants of the formation of FTAs: 
(i)  Distance is used as a proxy for transport costs: two countries that are geographically 
close  will  have  lower  transport  costs.  The  lower  the  transport  costs  between 
countries,  the  more  each  country  can  consume  the  other  country’s  varieties, 
enhancing trade creation regionally and the formation of FTAs. 
(ii)  Incomes are used as a proxy of the economic size of the participating countries.  
Other  Variables  that  are  associated  to  a  higher  probability  of  forming  FTAs  are 
contiguity and common language, as proxies for trade facilitation. 
 
V.  Data, stylized Facts and Main Results 
1.  Data and Stylized Facts 
                                                 
14A balancing score test and a T-test were conducted to check the differences within bands of the 
propensity score between treated and untreated country pairs. The FTA data are taken from Jose De Sousa’s website
15. Distance, common language 
and contiguity come from CEPII. Income, trade and emissions data are from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009) and cover the period dating from 1998 to 
2008.  
The main variables used in the emissions equation are per capita real gross domestic 
product (GDPcap); per capita carbon dioxide emissions (Em) as a proxy for the level of 
pollution and environmental degradation; the openness ratio (Open), which is calculated 
as exports plus imports over GDP; total population (Pop) and the FTA variable that 
takes a value of one if a pair of countries is participating in the same FTA and zero 
otherwise. The date of entry into force of the FTAs is considered in the construction of 
this variable. All variables are transformed by taking natural logarithms, such that the 
associated coefficients in the estimated model can be interpreted as elasticities. Table 
A.2 in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for the described variables. 
As  shown  by  Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2009),  closer  countries  with  a  similar  level  of 
wealth are more likely to join a free trade agreement. Table (1) reveals that the means of 
(ln) distance, sum of (ln) gross domestic products and language and adjacency differ 
between countries linked by an FTA and pairs of countries without an FTA. Countries 
linked by FTAs tend to be closer and richer. Moreover, they are more likely to have 
common borders and share the same language than the rest. 
 
Table 1. Summary of covariate means 
 
Figures (1) and (2) show some differences in the bilateral distances between pairs of 
countries involved and not involved in FTAs. Figure (1) shows that pairs of countries 
                                                 
15 http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm. with an FTA are closer than those without an FTA. The kernel densities function of (ln) 
bilateral  distances  for  non-FTA  pairs  of  countries  is  more  centered  to  the  right  in 
relation  to  the  kernel  density  function  of  (ln)  bilateral  distances  for  FTA  pairs  of 
countries. 
 
Figure 1. Kernel density of the log of bilateral distance for pair wise countries 
without and with an FTA 
Figure (2) shows that country pairs with an FTA tend to be larger economically. The 
Kernel density function for countries with an FTA is centered to the right in comparison 
to pairs without one. 
Figure 2. Kernel density of the sum of the log of GDPs pair wise countries without 
and with an FTA 
 
2.  Main Results 
The matching was implemented for each single year. Country pairs for each year in 
which there was at least one agreement (year by year) are matched with country pairs 
without an agreement using propensity matching scores and then a dataset was created 
with the matched data
16.  
Based  on  the  pooled  cross-section  data,  Table  A.3  in  the  Appendix  displays  the 
efficiency  of  the  matching  procedure.  The  balancing  property  is  verified
17.  The 
                                                 
16 The Stata command pscore was used to check that the balancing property is satisfied (number of blocks 
between 5 and 8) and the command psmatch2 with a calliper (0.01) was used for the matching (years with 
matching and common support satisfied: 1981, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997-
1998 and 1999-2008). 
17  For  each  independent  variable,  the  difference  between  target  and  control  countries  is  checked  by 
employing a T-test on the differences within bands of the propensity score. reduction in bias
18 is drastic when the bias is initially high. Once reduced, the bias does 
not exceed the threshold of 16%. Thus, this method provides a valid group of countries 
to which we will compare changes in target countries’ performance. 
In order to illustrate the estimations used for the matching, the first column of Table (3) 
shows  the  results  of  a  pooled  cross-section  estimation  for  the  determinant  of  the 
decision to enter into an FTA for all country pairs (probit model given by equation 8).  
It supports the stylized facts and shows that economic characteristics and geographic 
conditions  are  the  main  determinants  of  the  decision  to join  an  FTA  for  the  whole 
sample.  Column  2  (Table  2)  shows  that  the  same  set  of  factors  are  statistically 
significant for the selected (matched) sample. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of FTAs 
 
Next, Equation (6) is estimated using OLS and also a Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) estimator that includes time effects. The main results are shown in Table 3. 
Columns (1) and (3) show the results for all pairs of countries, whereas columns (2) and 
(4) present our findings for the matched sample of countries. We include time-fixed 
effects in columns (3) and (4) in order to capture time trends that may affect emissions 
and are common for all countries.  
 
Table 3. Emissions pollution gap and economic integration 
 
The coefficient of the target variable, interaction variable (FTAij*Aftert) is negative and 
statistically  significant  in  both  samples.  This  is  the  only  coefficient  that  can  be 
                                                 
18 The bias could be defined as the difference of the sample mean in the treated and non treated sub-
samples divided by the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non treated 
groups. interpreted as causal. Countries involved in FTAs converge in terms of CO2 emissions 
after  the  entry  into  force  of  Free  Trade  Agreements.  This  negative  sign  can  be 
interpreted as supporting evidence for the PHH. We have to underline the fact that the 
effect of FTA participation is smaller for our selected sample than for the enlarged 
sample.  Our  preferred  specification,  with  the  difference-in-difference  and  matching 
techniques,  displays  a  coefficient  of  -0.07.  Hence,  the  gap  in  emissions  per  capita 
between countries involved in an FTA is around 7 percent lower than for countries 
without an FTA. 
With  respect  to  the  control  variables,  our  results  show  that  population  and  gross 
domestic product per capita ratios are positively related to the emissions gap. These 
variables  are  used  as  control  variables  and  are  assumed  to  capture  the  scale  and 
technique effect respectively. Convergence in the scale of the economy as well as in 
technology  is positively correlated to convergence in  emissions of CO2 for pairs of 
countries.  Concerning  the  openness  ratio,  the  corresponding  estimated  coefficient  is 
negative, indicating that more similarity in trade openness is negatively correlated to the 
emissions  gap.  However,  we  cannot  give  a  causal  interpretation  of  the  estimated 
coefficient, as we do not control for the endogeneity of this variable. 
In  the  second  step,  similar  estimations  are  made  for  the  Euro-Med  agreements 
(European Union countries and southern Mediterranean countries: Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia,  Egypt,  Jordan  and  Turkey).  Estimates  of  equation  6  with  time  effects  are 
shown in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4. As before, we first estimate Equation (6) for 
all pairs of countries, namely those involved in Euro-Med agreements (treated sample) 
and those not involved in any FTA in column (1). Second, equation (6) is estimated for 
the matched sample, namely the pairs of countries linked by a EUROMED agreement 
(treated units) and pairs of similar countries (selected control group) in column (2). The results shown in Table 4 indicate that the FTA effect is much more pronounced for 
EUROMED than for the whole sample (19 versus 7 percent). Indeed, the interaction 
variable  (EUROMEDij*Aftert)  that  proxies  the  Euro-Med  membership  effect  on  the 
emissions gap displays a coefficient of (-0.21) in the preferred specification. Hence, the 
gap in per capita emissions between countries involved in a Euro-Med agreement is 19 
percent  ((exp(-0.21)-1)*100)  lower  than  for  similar  countries  without  an  FTA. 
Therefore, the Euro-Med agreement fosters convergence of CO2 emissions. This result 
provides some support for the HH hypothesis: Southern Mediterranean countries might 
act as pollution havens due to their lax environmental regulations.  
 
Table 4. Emissions pollution gap and specific agreements 
 
Similarly, columns (3)  and (4) in Table 4 show the results when comparing EU-27 
countries to countries not involved in any FTA. In this case the estimated coefficient of 
(EUij*Aftert)  is  also  negative  and  statistically  significant  and  larger  (33  versus  19 
percent) than for EUROMED. It is worth noting that both the EUROMED and also the 
EU-27 agreement entail higher convergence of emissions than the average effect of all 
FTAs.  
Finally, columns (5) and (6) in Table 4 show the effect of being a NAFTA member on 
emissions convergence. Interestingly, whereas the results for the whole sample (column 
(5))  show  a  non-significant  effect  of  NAFTA,  the  estimations  using  matching  and 
difference-in-difference techniques display a strong negative effect. Results in column 
(6),  our  preferred  estimation,  show  that  emissions  convergence  increases  between 
partner countries with NAFTA membership. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient 




This paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on CO2 emissions. We adopted a 
reduced-form specification linked to the emissions convergence hypothesis in which 
relative emissions are explained using income, population, openness in relative terms 
and  a  dummy  for  FTA  agreements.  The  model  is  estimated  using  a  difference-in-
difference approach paying special attention to the potential selection induced by FTAs. 
A propensity matching technique is used to treat FTAs and to extract a sub-sample 
containing only matched pairs of countries that share similar characteristics. 
Our results consistently indicate that FTAs foster convergence of CO2 emissions. In 
particular, the gap in emissions per capita is seven percent lower for pairs of countries 
that have a bilateral trade agreement than for the rest when the matched sample is used.  
Our findings also provide a tentative answer to the question raised in this paper. Taken 
as a whole, our estimations indicate that the emissions pollution gap is 19 percent lower 
for pairs of countries involved in Euro-Mediterranean Agreements than for similar pairs 
of countries not involved in FTAs.  
An additional finding shows that the pollution gap for EU-27 pairs of countries is 33 
percent lower than for similar non-EU-27 countries. It is worth noting that reductions in 
the emission gap stemming from a deeper integration agreement, like the EU, are larger 
than those related to a North-South trade agreement such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreement.  One  final  result  indicates  that  stronger  convergence  between  partner 
countries is found for NAFTA than for the EU-27 and EUROMED countries. 
The main economic policy recommendation that can be derived from our results is that 
regional  integration  processes  seem  to  reduce  the  pollution  gap  between  pairs  of countries that have joined agreements. This main result provides indirect support for the 
PHH  and  for  environmentalists  fearing  that  less  developed  countries  may  act  as 
pollution havens. Moreover, higher levels of integration, namely a customs union versus 
a free trade agreement, appear to be linked to greater reductions in the above mentioned 
pollution gap.  
Further research concerning other pollutants is also desirable to ascertain whether the 
link between regional trade agreements and pollution convergence is in place. 
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Table1: Summary of covariate means 
  Country pairs with an FTA   Country pairs without an FTA 
Ln of distance  7.34  8.86 
Sum of the ln of GDPs  18.64  17.31 
Adjacency dummy  0.13  0.009 
Language dummy  0.26  0.15 
 
Table 2. Determinants of FTAs 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All  Matched 
Sum of the ln of GDPs  0.205***  0.127*** 
  [0.0034]  [0.0059] 
Ln distance  -0.955***  -0.212*** 
  [0.00708]  [0.011] 
Contiguity  0.0620**  0.297*** 
  [0.0262]  [0.0383] 
Common language  0.102***  0.110*** 
  [0.0151]  [0.0239] 
Pseudo R
2  0.395  0.032 
Observations  201,558  25,629 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
  
Table 3. Emissions pollution gap and economic integration 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  All  Matched  All  Matched 
FTAij  -0.218***  -0.175***  -0.222***  -0.179*** 
 
[0.0334]  [0.0314]  [0.0334]  [0.0315] 
Aftert  0.432***  0.248***  0.382***  0.194*** 
 
[0.0292]  [0.0326]  [0.0294]  [0.0343] 
FTAij*Aftert   -0.202***  -0.0734*  -0.210***  -0.0726* 
 
[0.0346]  [0.0379]  [0.0347]  [0.0379] 
Abs Ln population ratio  0.734***  0.822***  0.734***  0.823*** 
 
[0.00264]  [0.00691]  [0.00264]  [0.00692] 
Abs Ln GDP per capita ratio  0.389***  0.106***  0.391***  0.110*** 
 
[0.0048]  [0.0148]  [0.00481]  [0.0148] 
Abs Ln openness ratio  -0.405***  -0.125***  -0.414***  -0.137*** 
 
[0.00913]  [0.0221]  [0.00917]  [0.0222] 
Time fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  176,045  22,423  176,045  22,423 
R-squared  0.390  0.523  0.391  0.525 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Abs denotes absolute value and Ln natural logarithms. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4. Emissions pollution gap and specific agreements 
  EUROMED  EUROMED  EU-27  EU-27  NAFTA  NAFTA 
VARIABLES  All  Matched  All  Matched  All  Matched 
EUij  -0.330***  -0.158***  -0.310***  -0.155***  -0.156  -0.0392 
  [0.0521]  [0.0439]  (0.0327)  (0.0406)  [0.272]  [0.147] 
Aftert  0.108**  0.162***  0.379***  0.546***  0.374***  1.284*** 
  [0.0523]  [0.0489]  (0.0295)  (0.0379)  [0.0296]  [0.367] 
EUij*Aftert   -0.341***  -0.211***  -0.260***  -0.409***  0.247  -
0.787***    [0.0591]  [0.0507]  (0.0340)  (0.0424)  [0.307]  [0.265] 
Abs Ln 
population ratio 
0.771***  0.817***  0.733***  0.778***  0.728***  0.0995 
  [0.0125]  [0.00854]  (0.00270)  (0.00461)  [0.0028]  [0.0853] 
Abs Ln GDP per 
capita ratio 
0.197***  0.118***  0.397***  0.507***  0.407***  0.562*** 
  [0.0221]  [0.018]  (0.00487)  (0.00705)  [0.00501]  [0.191] 
Abs Ln openness 
ratio 
-0.272***  -0.156***  -0.432***  -0.694***  -
0.439*** 
1.240*** 
  [0.0387]  [0.0278]  (0.00939)  (0.0153)  [0.00976]  [0.196] 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 
Obsobservations 
159,712  14,867  168,882  63,269  155,611  176 
R-squared  0.505  0.549  0.388  0.436  0.365  0.473 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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